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Abstract
Using Spanish confidential supervisory data, this paper examines the effect of geographic 
and business complexity, their interaction and relative importance for banks’ risk, 
where the degree of complexity stems from the corporate structure of banking 
groups affiliates. The results show that while business complexity results in higher 
risk, geographic complexity gives rise to diversification benefits, thus lowering risk. 
However, geographic complexity alone is not enough, as its effect depends on how it 
interacts with business complexity. Higher business complexity abroad in relation to that 
at home may counterbalance the benefits of diversification. In the same vein, focusing 
abroad on areas in which the group does not have expertise at home also results in 
higher risk.
Keywords: risk, global banking, bank complexity, diversification benefits.
JEL classification: F21, F23, G21, G32.
Resumen
Utilizando datos confidenciales españoles de supervisión, este trabajo examina el efecto 
sobre el riesgo bancario de la complejidad geográfica y empresarial, y su interacción e 
importancia relativa, donde el grado de complejidad se basa en la estructura corporativa 
de las filiales del grupo bancario. Los resultados muestran que, mientras la complejidad 
empresarial genera un mayor riesgo, la complejidad geográfica genera beneficios de 
diversificación, por lo que reduce el riesgo. Sin embargo, la complejidad geográfica no 
es buena por sí sola, ya que depende de cómo se desarrolle. Una mayor complejidad 
empresarial en el extranjero en relación con la nacional puede contrarrestar estos 
beneficios de diversificación. En la misma línea, centrarse en el extranjero en áreas en 
las que el grupo no tiene experiencia en el ámbito nacional también se traduce en un 
mayor riesgo.
Palabras clave:  riesgo, bancos globales, complejidad bancaria, beneficios de diversificación.
Códigos JEL: F21, F23, G21, G32.




Recent trends in banking show increased bank concentration in terms of business lines and geographic 
coverage (CGFS, 2010a). In fact, there seems to be a return to traditional banking and a home bias as 
far as the geographical location of activity is concerned (CGFS, 2010b). The reasons are varied: 
efficiency and profitability, institutional change, organisational simplicity and regulation. The 
resolution framework, the segregation of activities or ring-fencing, among other regulatory changes, 
are forcing banks to reconsider their organisational structure and whether their expansion abroad and 
their business diversification strategy are the most appropriate (Ichiue and Lambert, 2016). The 
assessment of the effects on risk of such retrenchment and refocusing have not been widely analysed. 
Given that some regulatory proposals aim to reduce such complexity to address systemic risk, it is 
important to contribute to the provision of evidence on the relationship between bank complexity and 
bank risk. 
Increased complexity may lead banks to either assume higher risk stemming from heightened agency 
problems or lower risk as a result of diversification benefits. The available empirical literature is 
inconclusive on whether one effect predominates over the other. Moreover, complexity is 
multidimensional, with different dimensions giving rise to different effects (Krause et al. 2017).  
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relevance of banks’ complexity for banks’ risk. We 
consider both the geographic and the business dimension, focusing on the number and types of 
subsidiaries of banking groups, including those which are not financial institutions.1 The distribution 
of affiliates across different geographical locations and/or different business types within a banking 
organisation can make management and monitoring more difficult, thus resulting in higher risk. Less 
expertise can be associated with lending in a new sector or location thus giving rise to reduced 
monitoring or lower monitoring effectiveness (Acharya et al., 2006). On the other hand, the 
                                                 
See Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014), for a definition of organisational and business complexity. The designation of global 
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systemically important banks proposes different metrics of complexity linked to what an entity does.  
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concentration of activity in business areas where the banking group has expertise or with low cycle 
correlation should lessen agency problems if diversification is in activities entailing higher risk. If, 
moreover, affiliates abroad are located in countries with low synchrony with the business cycle of the 
country of the parent bank, diversification benefits may result, giving rise to lower risk. The 
combination of both types of complexity may either reinforce or mitigate the effects. 
Since 1997, the Spanish banking system has undergone a major consolidation process, leading to a 
large reduction in the number of operating banks. It has resulted in larger, more complex financial 
groups, including some of the most internationalised among their peers (De Haan et al., 2009). 
However, there is substantial heterogeneity in complexity across Spanish banking groups, which 
include not only G-SIBs, but also medium-sized and small banks with activity abroad and covering 
different business lines.  
We empirically test three different hypotheses: a) the combination of geographic complexity with 
business complexity would result in higher risk; b) the higher the business complexity abroad in 
comparison to the business complexity at home, the higher the risk, and c) the higher the difference 
between the business model at home and the business model abroad, the higher the risk. 
We find evidence that supports all three hypotheses. While business complexity results in higher risk, 
geographic complexity gives rise to diversification benefits, and thus, to lower risk. However, 
geographic complexity alone is not enough. High business complexity abroad in relation to that at 
home may counterbalance the diversification benefits. In the same vein, focusing abroad on areas in 
which the group does not have expertise at home also results in higher risk. The evidence gathered 
clarifies the dimensions of complexity that give rise to higher risk, thus contributing to the discussion 
on designing regulation aimed at reducing complexity at the banks’ level as a means of strengthening 
overall financial stability and promoting sustainable profitability. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the framework and the 
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empirical approach and the results are in Section 4. Section 5 presents the robustness tests and Section 
6 concludes with implications for policy. 
 
2. Framework and hypotheses 
The degree of complexity of banking groups stems from the corporate structure of their affiliates, 
where the term affiliate, with respect to bank i, refers to any company that bank i controls I and any 
other company that is controlled by a company that bank i controls, as long as the effective control 
of bank i is above the 50% threshold. In line with Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014), we proxy complexity 
by the number of affiliates or the degree of concentration of the affiliates along two different 
dimensions: i) geographic location; and ii) business activities.   
According to previous literature, geographic and business diversification can generate different 
effects on risk, as a result of different factors such as governance (Correa and Goldberg, 2020) or 
control (Argimón and Rodríguez-Moreno, 2021). Here, we formulate a set of three hypotheses that 
try to establish the interaction between these two types of complexity and their relative importance. 
First, we analyse the impact on risk of complexity along the geographic and business dimensions and 
their combination. To this end, we study the role played by the geographic and business complexity 
of the overall group as regards risk. We aim to establish if the effect of these two types of complexity 
on risk is similar, whether they enhance each other or whether one has a mitigating role vis-à-vis the 
other, given that heterogeneity of location and business lines in affiliates may help diversify risk. We 
define a multiplicative variable of geographic complexity and overall business complexity to test for 
the interaction of the two types of complexity. We expect the combination of both types of complexity 
to result in lower monitoring and thus higher risk. 
Therefore, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1. The combination of geographic complexity and business complexity would result in higher risk 
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Second, regarding the internationalisation strategy, we analyse the different effects that business 
complexity at home and abroad may have on risk. We use the ratio of business complexity abroad 
over business complexity at home to test for the difference. The larger the value of the ratio, the larger 
the complexity abroad in relation to complexity at home, and thus the higher the agency problems. 
Our a priori assumption is that the greater the business complexity abroad vis-à-vis complexity at 
home, the higher the bank’s risk, as a result of poorer monitoring.  
Our second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H2. The higher the business complexity abroad compared with business complexity at home, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, we analyse whether the differences between the business line abroad and the business line at 
home have an effect on risk. We construct variables that measure the relative importance of the 
different business lines at home and abroad. In particular, we measure the relevance of retail banking 
at home and abroad, but also of other business lines. The larger the difference, the higher the risk that 
we can expect, as a result of poorer monitoring.   
Our last hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk 
 
3. Data 
We have used confidential supervisory data at the highest bank consolidated level for all Spanish 
commercial, saving and mutual banks from 2005Q1 to 2016Q4,2 a period characterised by major 
changes in the Spanish banking system which had a direct impact on their complexity structures.  
                                                 
2 We only consider banks that are the parent bank of a group, or single banks not belonging to a group and with no 
banking affiliates. Hereafter, we will indistinctly use the term bank or banking group to refer to them. 
6 
 
Second, regarding the internationalisation strategy, e analyse the different effects that business 
co plexity at ho e and abroad ay have on risk. e use the ratio of business co plexity abroad 
over business co plexity at ho e to test for the difference. he larger the value of the ratio, the larger 
the co plexity abroad in relation to co plexity at ho e, and thus the higher the agency proble s. 
ur a priori assu ption is that the greater the business co plexity abroad vis-à-vis co plexity at 
ho e, the higher the bank’s risk, as a result of poorer onitoring.  
ur second hypothesis can be for ulated as follo s: 
2. The higher the business co plexity abroad co pared ith business co plexity at ho e, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, e analyse hether the differences bet een the business line abroad and the business line at 
ho e have an effect on risk. e construct variables that easure the relative i portance of the 
different business lines at ho e and abroad. In particular, e easure the relevance of retail banking 
at ho e and abroad, but also of other business lines. he larger the difference, the higher the risk that 
e can expect, as a result of poorer onitoring.   
ur last hypothesis reads as follo s: 
3. The higher the difference bet een the business line at ho e and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk 
 
3. ata 
e have used confidential supervisory data at the highest bank consolidated level for all Spanish 
co ercial, saving and utual banks fro  2005 1 to 2016 4,2 a period characterised by ajor 
changes in the Spanish banking syste  hich had a direct i pact on their co plexity structures.  
                                                 
2 e only consider banks that are the parent bank of a group, or single banks not belonging to a group and with no 
banking affiliates. Hereafter, we will indistinctly use the ter  bank or banking group to refer to the . 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2132
6 
 
Second, regarding the internationalisation strategy, we analyse the different effects that business 
complexity at home and abroad may have on risk. We use the ratio of business complexity abroad 
over business complexity at home to test for the difference. The larger the value of the ratio, the larger 
the complexity abroad in relation to complexity at home, and thus the higher the agency problems. 
Our a priori assumption is that the greater the business complexity abroad vis-à-vis complexity at 
home, the higher the bank’s risk, as a result of poorer monitoring.  
Our second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H2. The higher the business complexity abroad compared with business complexity at home, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, we analyse whether the differences between the business line abroad and the business line at 
home have an effect on risk. We construct variables that measure the relative importance of the 
different business lines at home and abroad. In particular, we measure the relevance of retail banking 
at home and abroad, but also of other business lines. The larger the difference, the higher the risk that 
we can expect, as a result of poorer monitoring.   
Our last hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk 
 
3. Data 
We have used confidential supervisory data at the highest bank consolidated level for all Spanish 
commercial, saving and mutual banks from 2005Q1 to 2016Q4,2 a period characterised by major 
changes in the Spanish banking system which had a direct impact on their complexity structures.  
                                                 
2 We only consider banks that are the parent bank of a group, or single banks not belonging to a group and with no 
banking affiliates. Hereafter, we will indistinctly use the term bank or banking group to refer to them. 
6 
 
Second, regarding the internationalisation strategy, we analyse the different effects that business 
complexity at home and abroad may have on risk. We use the ratio of business complexity abroad 
over business complexity at home to test for the difference. The larger the value of the ratio, the larger 
the complexity abroad in relation to complexity at home, and thus the higher the agency problems. 
Our a priori assumption is that the greater the business complexity abroad vis-à-vis complexity at 
home, the higher the bank’s risk, as a result of poorer monitoring.  
Our second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H2. The higher the business complexity abroad compared with business complexity at home, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, we analyse whether the differences between the business line abroad and the business line at 
home have an effect on risk. We construct variables that measure the relative importance of the 
different business lines at home and abroad. In particular, we measure the relevance of retail banking 
at home and abroad, but also of other business lines. The larger the difference, the higher the risk that 
we can expect, as a result of poorer monitoring.   
Our last hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk 
 
3. Data 
We have used confidential supervisory data at the highest bank consolidated level for all Spanish 
commercial, saving and mutual banks from 2005Q1 to 2016Q4,2 a period characterised by major 
changes in the Spanish banking system which had a direct impact on their complexity structures.  
                                                 
2 We only consider banks that are the parent bank of a group, or single banks not belonging to a group and with no 
banking affiliates. Hereafter, we will indistinctly use the term bank or banking group to refer to them. 
7 
 
Figure 1 depicts the number of banks in our sample. Before 2011, there were around 80 Spanish 
banking groups in operation, half of them with affiliates abroad. In 2011, a sizeable reduction in the 
number of banks took place as a consequence of the consolidation process undergone by Spanish 
banks.  From 2012 onwards, the number of groups continued to fall, from 46 in 2012 to 31 at the end 
of the sample period. To address this intense period of mergers and acquisitions, we have conducted 
the analysis in such a way that the acquiring bank’s code is maintained and the target bank is dropped 
from the sample. In addition, as a robustness test, we have followed Meslier et al. (2016) and present 
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For every member of the banking group, the report contains the identification code, sector code 
(CNAE), residence country, voting rights, portfolio type and net worth of the entities that belong 
direct or indirectly to the group. To identify those affiliates which are relevant for the group, we keep 
all the shares in entities in the economic group, multi-group and associates (thus we exclude the 
trading portfolio or financial assets available for sale, among others) and we restrict our analysis to 
those entities in which the parent has 50% or more of the voting rights.3 We use  the information on 
net worth to proxy the size of each affiliate inside the banking group. Thus, we report two types of 
complexity measures, one based on the number of affiliates and another based on net worth. Net 
worth can be a good proxy for the relevance in quantitative terms of each affiliate in the overall group. 
Indeed, it has the advantage over other balance sheet measures that it is not subject to intra-group 
accounting factors, either for liquidity or solvency support. We group the business activities into five 
categories: i) bank; ii) other financial;4 iii) real estate; iv) insurance; and v) non-financial activities.  
Definitions of variables 
                                                 
3 This criterion is consistent with Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014). 
4 This category covers different activities such as investment funds, venture capital companies or securitisation funds.  
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We proxy risk by the negative value of the natural logarithm of the z-score, which can be interpreted 
as a negative distance-to-default measure.5  The z-score of bank i at time t is calculated as: 
𝒛𝒛 − 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 =




where ROA is the average return on assets, E/A, is the average equity to assets ratio and 𝝈𝝈𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑨𝑨 is the 
standard deviation of ROA, which proxies ROA’s volatility. They are all computed over the k periods 
from t-k+1 to t, where k is 12 quarters, in keeping with the empirical literature (Berger et al., 2016). 
A higher z-score indicates a safer bank (the higher the value of the chosen variable, the higher the 
risk). As we use data from consolidated statements, these series reflect the ex-post risk generated by 
all the operations of the banking group in both their home countries and those of their affiliates, both 
local and cross-border. Although this indicator has limitations as a risk measure, it has the advantage 
that it can be defined for non-listed institutions, which constitute the majority of our sample. Table 1 
reports the descriptive statistics of the z-score along with other bank groups’ key variables, such as 
profitability, size or efficiency.  
We next define the set of complexity measures. Table 2 describes these measures and Table 3 reports 
the main descriptive statistics. Complexity measures are grouped into three categories: i) counts; ii) 
HHI based on net worth; and iii) Deviation in activity. In the first category we define the complexity 
of a bank group based on the number of countries (geographical areas) or the number of business 
activities. In the second category we construct normalised HHI where the size of each affiliate is 
given by its net worth. The HHI ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest complexity 
and 1 the highest complexity. Complexity measures based on counts and HHI have been previously 
used in the literature (see Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2014). However, in contrast to previous studies, we 
use the affiliate size to construct the HHI instead of using the simple counts. The last category of 
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5 Since the z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the z-score which is normally distributed (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2132
8 
 
We proxy risk by the negative value of the natural logarithm of the z-score, which can be interpreted 
as a negative distance-to-default measure.5  The z-score of bank i at time t is calculated as: 
𝒛𝒛 − 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 =




where ROA is the average return on assets, E/A, is the average equity to assets ratio and 𝝈𝝈𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑨𝑨 is the 
standard deviation of ROA, which proxies ROA’s volatility. They are all computed over the k periods 
from t-k+1 to t, where k is 12 quarters, in keeping with the empirical literature (Berger et al., 2016). 
A higher z-score indicates a safer bank (the higher the value of the chosen variable, the higher the 
risk). As we use data from consolidated statements, these series reflect the ex-post risk generated by 
all the operations of the banking group in both their home countries and those of their affiliates, both 
local and cross-border. Although this indicator has limitations as a risk measure, it has the advantage 
that it can be defined for non-listed institutions, which constitute the majority of our sample. Table 1 
reports the descriptive statistics of the z-score along with other bank groups’ key variables, such as 
profitability, size or efficiency.  
We next define the set of complexity measures. Table 2 describes these measures and Table 3 reports 
the main descriptive statistics. Complexity measures are grouped into three categories: i) counts; ii) 
HHI based on net worth; and iii) Deviation in activity. In the first category we define the complexity 
of a bank group based on the number of countries (geographical areas) or the number of business 
activities. In the second category we construct normalised HHI where the size of each affiliate is 
given by its net worth. The HHI ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest complexity 
and 1 the highest complexity. Complexity measures based on counts and HHI have been previously 
used in the literature (see Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2014). However, in contrast to previous studies, we 
use the affiliate size to construct the HHI instead of using the simple counts. The last category of 
                                                 




complexity indicates deviation, in absolute terms, in certain business activities in and out Spain. This 
measure ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that there are no differences in the business model 
developed in the home country and abroad while 1 indicates completely different business models.  
Complexity measures based on net worth provide a more accurate description of the bank group’s 
activity, as they capture how the affiliates contribute to the group. However, the dynamics in 
affiliates’ activity are similar using counts and net worth and thus, we do not expect large 
discrepancies across the different categories.  
 
4. Empirical approach and results 
4.1. Empirical approach 
Our empirical analysis is focused on the effect of different types of complexity on banks’ risk. We 
estimate, with OLS, equations of the form: 
−𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝒛𝒛 − 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝜷𝜷𝒋𝒋𝑪𝑪𝒔𝒔𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒔𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪𝒔𝒔𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊�𝒌𝒌 + 𝚪𝚪𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊�𝒌𝒌 + 𝚯𝚯𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊�𝒌𝒌 + 𝜹𝜹𝒊𝒊 + 𝝃𝝃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 (2) 
where the right-hand side variables are measured at period t-k to ensure that they are predetermined 
in relation to the dependent variable and k is the period over which we compute the risk variable. In 
general, we are interested in the sign and statistical significance of the complexity index coefficients 
(βj). We include a set of control variables at bank group (𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊�𝒌𝒌) and macroeconomic (𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊�𝒌𝒌) level. In 
addition, we include year fixed effects. We estimate all the equations with heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. 
Among the bank controls we include a set of proxies of bank size (logarithm of total assets), efficiency 
(bank’s operating expenses over total income), size of traditional activity (loan to asset ratio), liquidity 
(liquid assets over total assets) and asset quality (NPL). Table 1 reports their descriptive statistics. 
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We include a vector of time-varying macro variables to control for supply conditions in the home 
country. We proxy the financial cycle with the credit-to-GDP gap in the home country and business 
conditions with annual GDP growth. 
4.2. Results 
 H1. The combination of geographic complexity and business complexity results in higher risk  
Testing for H1 requires that we use, for each specification, a complexity index for business, one for 
geography and a combination of the two indices to capture the interaction. We thus define 
D.HighComplexity_CountryBusiness as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the group has 
combined high geographic and business complexity, and zero otherwise. We consider that a banking 
group has high complexity in a given dimension if it presents values of the index at or above the 
median of the quarterly distribution. 
Figure 2 reports the net worth HHI complexity indices that we use to test for this hypothesis and 
which are aligned with the patterns observed with count measures and already discussed in Section 
3. The increase in dispersion in 2011 is also reflected in the HHI business, which also temporarily 
increases its dispersion at higher values (Panel A) in 2011 and 2012. The overall evolution shows that 
median business complexity in 2016 is higher than in 2005. Thus, the consolidation process that has 
taken place over these twelve years has generally resulted in higher complexity as measured by our 
index. We also observe larger median complexity in geographical terms between 2005 and 2016, with 
a large increase in dispersion, especially in the upper percentile, since 2011. However, complexity in 
geographic terms is much lower than in business terms, although they are not really comparable, as 
many banks have little or no activity abroad for most of the period under analysis (46 out of 97). It is 
only when restructuring has taken place that complexity in the geographic dimension grows. 
Under H1 we are interested in the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for the 
geographic and business complexity indices as well as in the coefficient of the interaction dummy. A 
positive sign would imply that agency costs predominate, while a negative sign indicates that 
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diversification benefits predominate. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of the 
dummy captures the joint effect of geographic and business complexity. Thus, if our hypothesis holds, 
we can expect the coefficient to be positive.  Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. 
First, we consider the effects of business complexity on risk. According to the results recorded in 
column (1), when we use simple count indices, and in column (2) when we use net worth HHI, banks 
that show higher business complexity have higher risk. The more dispersed banking groups are in 
relation to their activities, the higher their risk, a result which is aligned with the hypothesis that banks 
operating in business areas where they have less expertise become less effective in monitoring risk. 
Therefore, agency costs predominate when we consider diversification in business lines.  
When we consider the effects of geographic complexity, we find that diversification benefits 
predominate. It therefore seems that the more geographically dispersed the affiliates of a bank are, 
the lower the risk. Such a result is aligned with empirical evidence that geographic expansion reduces 
risk when banks expand into areas with low macroeconomic correlation (Goetz et al., 2016), which 
is probably the case when the activity in a particular country is low, as captured by a high HHI. This 
finding is in keeping with the fact that most of the activity carried out by Spanish banking groups 
with affiliates located abroad is in countries whose synchrony with the Spanish business cycle is 
rather low. This less than perfect correlation could be the driver of diversification benefits (Argimón, 
2017). 
The interaction between the two complexity measures shows that agency costs predominate. Banking 
groups with high complexity in both geographic and business terms show higher risk. The estimated 
effects of the dummy variables are consistently positive, in both specifications, which is the expected 
direction under our hypothesis: the combination of geographic and business complexity results in 
higher risk.6  
                                                 
6 The results are qualitatively the same when using the complexity measures at geographical level based on geographic areas 
instead of countries. 
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diversification benefits predominate. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of the 
dummy captures the joint effect of geographic and business complexity. Thus, if our hypothesis holds, 
we can expect the coefficient to be positive.  Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. 
First, we consider the effects of business complexity on risk. According to the results recorded in 
column (1), when we use simple count indices, and in column (2) when we use net worth HHI, banks 
that show higher business complexity have higher risk. The more dispersed banking groups are in 
relation to their activities, the higher their risk, a result which is aligned with the hypothesis that banks 
operating in business areas where they have less expertise become less effective in monitoring risk. 
Therefore, agency costs predominate when we consider diversification in business lines.  
When we consider the effects of geographic complexity, we find that diversification benefits 
predominate. It therefore seems that the more geographically dispersed the affiliates of a bank are, 
the lower the risk. Such a result is aligned with empirical evidence that geographic expansion reduces 
risk when banks expand into areas with low macroeconomic correlation (Goetz et al., 2016), which 
is probably the case when the activity in a particular country is low, as captured by a high HHI. This 
finding is in keeping with the fact that most of the activity carried out by Spanish banking groups 
with affiliates located abroad is in countries whose synchrony with the Spanish business cycle is 
rather low. This less than perfect correlation could be the driver of diversification benefits (Argimón, 
2017). 
The interaction between the two complexity measures shows that agency costs predominate. Banking 
groups with high complexity in both geographic and business terms show higher risk. The estimated 
effects of the dummy variables are consistently positive, in both specifications, which is the expected 
direction under our hypothesis: the combination of geographic and business complexity results in 
higher risk.6  
                                                 
6 The results are qualitatively the same when using the complexity measures at geographical level based on geographic areas 
instead of countries. 
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H2. The higher the business complexity abroad in comparison to at home, the higher the risk 
To test f r H2, comparing business complexity abroad and at home, we build the ratio of the 
complexity measure based on the affiliates located outside Spain relative to the complexity measure 
based on the affiliates located in Spain. The larger the ratio of the indices, the more complex the 
activity abroad in relation to the activity at home. Under H2 we expect the estimated coefficient of 
the ratio to be positive, if the hypothesis of loss of influence capacity associated with complexity 
holds.  
We report the results in Table 5. Columns (1) – (2) report the results using the simple counts while 
columns (3) – (4) use the net worth HHI. The number of observations reported in columns (3) – (4) 
has been reduced to one third of the total, as the complexity at business level in Spain in two thirds 
of the observations s zero. Columns (1) and (3) r port the re ults when we only include the busines
complexity ratio in the regression and columns (2) – (4) when we also consider the complexity in the 
geographical dimension. Again, we obtain that geographic complexity reduces risk. Moreover, the 
positive sign estimated for the coefficient of the ratio of the indices confirms our hypothesis that more 
complexity abroad than at home reinforces agency problems and thus increases risk.  
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, testing for H3 requires comparing the business model abroad and at home, using the 
Deviation in Activity Indices defined in Table 2. The larger the value of the complexity index, the 
more divergent are the activities carried out abroad in relation to those carried out at home. It does 
not matter whether the deviation is an upward one, with the affiliates abroad having more banking 
activity than the affiliates located in Spain, or a downward one, with the affiliates abroad having less 
banking activity than the affiliates located in Spain. In fact, there is no specific direction in the 
difference between the two weights, except in real estate, where the weight of affiliates abroad seems 
to be generally higher, as shown in Figure 3, which plots for each business activity, showing, in the 
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vertical axis, the weight that the affiliates located abroad give to each activity relative to total activity 
abroad. The horizontal axis shows the same weight obtained for the affiliates located in Spain. We 
observe that for all activities, the distribution of observations above and below the 45-degree line, 
depicted in red, is rather similar, except for the concentration above the line in the real estate sector.  
What matters for H3 is the size of the difference, as we expect that the larger the divergence is, the 
lower the influence capacity, and thus the higher the risk. We thus expect the sign of the coefficient 
to be positive. We have included in the equation to be estimated, besides the deviation index, and as 
an additional control, the weight that the net worth of affiliates located abroad has in total net worth. 
This variable captures the direct relevance of foreign activity on risk, thus complementing the effect 
provided by the complexity of such activity.7 
Deviating from the activity that is carried out at home results in higher risk, as recorded in Table 6, 
while the higher the activity abroad, the lower the risk. The estimated coefficients for four out of the 
five complexity indices defined for each of the business lines are positive and significant. Only the 
coefficient for other financial activities is negative, but not statistically significant. The results are 
thus aligned with H3, in that the higher the difference between the business model at home and the 
business model abroad, the higher the risk.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
We have carried out two different robustness checks. The first one addresses the issue of outliers 
arising in relation to the timing of the merger processes, which could be driving the results. The 
second one addresses concerns in relation to ownership structure.    
5.1. Relevance of timing of mergers 
 
                                                 
7 The results hold if this control is removed. 
13 
 
vertical axis, the weight that the affiliates located abroad give to each activity relative to total activity 
abroad. The horizontal axis shows the same weight obtained for the affiliates located in Spain. We 
observe that for all activities, the distribution of observations above and below the 45-degree line, 
depicted in red, is rather similar, except for the concentration above the line in the real estate sector.  
What matters for H3 is the size of the difference, as we expect that the larger the divergence is, the 
lower the influence capacity, and thus the higher the risk. We thus expect the sign of the coefficient 
to be positive. We have included in the equation to be estimated, besides the deviation index, and as 
an additional control, the weight that the net worth of affiliates located abroad has in total net worth. 
This variable captures the direct relevance of foreign activity on risk, thus complementing the effect 
provided by the complexity of such activity.7 
Deviating from the activity that is carried out at home results in higher risk, as recorded in Table 6, 
while the higher the activity abroad, the lower the risk. The estimated coefficients for four out of the 
five complexity indices defined for each of the business lines are positive and significant. Only the 
coefficient for other financial activities is negative, but not statistically significant. The results are 
thus aligned with H3, in that the higher the difference between the business model at home and the 
business model abroad, the higher the risk.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
We have carried out two different robustness checks. The first one addresses the issue of outliers 
arising in relation to the timing of the merger processes, which could be driving the results. The 
second one addresses concerns in relation to ownership structure.    
5.1. Relevance of timing of mergers 
 
                                                 
7 The results hold if t is control is removed. 
12 
 
H2. The higher the business complexity abroad in comparison to at home, the higher the risk 
To test for H2, comparing business complexity abroad and at home, we build the ratio of the 
complexity measure based on the affiliates located outside Spain relative to the complexity measure 
based on the affiliates located in Spain. The larger the ratio of the indices, the more complex the 
activity abroad in relation to the activity at home. Under H2 we expect the estimated coefficient of 
the ratio to be positive, if the hypothesis of loss of influence capacity associated with complexity 
holds.  
We report the results in Table 5. Columns (1) – (2) report the results using the simple counts while 
columns (3) – (4) use the net worth HHI. The number of observations reported in columns (3) – (4) 
has been reduced to one third of the total, as the complexity at business level in Spain in two thirds 
of the observations is zero. Columns (1) and (3) report the results when we only include the business 
complexity ratio in the regression and columns (2) – (4) when we also consider the complexity in the 
geographical dimension. Again, we obtain that geographic complexity reduces risk. Moreover, the 
positive sign estimated for the coefficient of the ratio of the indices confirms our hypothesis that more 
complexity abroad than at home reinforces agency problems and thus increases risk.  
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, testing for H3 requires comparing the business model abroad and at home, using the 
Deviation in Activity Indices defined in Table 2. The larger the value of the complexity index, the 
more divergent are the activities carried out abroad in relation to those carried out at home. It does 
not matter whether the deviation is an upward one, with the affiliates abroad having more banking 
activity than the affiliates located in Spain, or a downward one, with the affiliates abroad having less 
banking activity than the affiliates located in Spain. In fact, there is no specific direction in the 
difference between the two weights, except in real estate, where the weight of affiliates abroad seems 
to be generally higher, as shown in Figure 3, which plots for each business activity, showing, in the 
12 
 
H2. The higher the business complexity abroad in comparison to at home, the higher the risk 
To test for H2, comparing business complexity abroad and at home, we build the ratio of the 
complexity measure based on the affiliates located outside Spain relative to the complexity measure 
based on the affiliates located in Spain. The larger the ratio of the indices, the more complex the 
activity abroad in relation to the activity at home. Under H2 we expect the estimated coefficient of 
the ratio to be positive, if the hypothesis of loss of influence capacity associated with complexity 
holds.  
e report the results in Table 5. Columns (1) – (2) report the results using the simple counts while 
columns (3) – (4) use the net worth HHI. The number of observations reported in columns (3) – (4) 
has been reduced to one third of the total, as the complexity at business level in Spain in two thirds 
of the observations is zero. Columns (1) and (3) report the results when we only include the business 
complexity ratio in the regression and columns (2) – (4) when we also consider the complexity in the 
geographical dimension. Again, we obtain that geographic complexity reduces risk. oreover, the 
positive sign estimated for the coefficient of the ratio of the indices confirms our hypothesis that more 
complexity abroad than at home reinforces agency problems and thus increases risk.  
H3. The higher the difference between the business line at home and the business line abroad, the 
higher the risk  
Finally, testing for H3 requires comparing the business model abroad and at home, using the 
Deviation in Activity Indices defined in Table 2. The larger the value of the complexity index, the 
more divergent are the activities carried out abroad in relation to those carried out at home. It does 
not matter whether the deviation is an upward one, with the affiliates abroad having more banking 
activity than the affiliates located in Spain, or a downward one, with the affiliates abroad having less 
banking activity than the affiliates located in Spain. In fact, there is no specific direction in the 
difference between the two weights, except in real estate, where the weight of affiliates abroad seems 
to be generally higher, as shown in Figure 3, which plots for each business activity, showing, in the 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2132
13 
 
vertical axis, the weight that the affiliates located abroad give to each activity relative to total activity 
abroad. The horizontal axis shows the same weight obtained for the affiliates located in Spain. We 
observe that for all activities, the distribution of observations above and below the 45-degree line, 
depicted in red, is rather similar, except for the concentration above the line in the real estate sector.  
What matters for H3 is the size of the difference, as we expect that the larger the divergence is, the 
lower the influence capacity, and thus the higher the risk. We thus expect the sign of the coefficient 
to be positive. We have included in the equation to be estimated, besides the deviation index, and as 
an additional control, the weight that the net worth of affiliates located abroad has in total net worth. 
This variable captures the direct relevance of foreign activity on risk, thus complementing the effect 
provided by the complexity of such activity.7 
Deviating from the activity that is carried out at home results in higher risk, as recorded in Table 6, 
while the higher the activity abroad, the lower the risk. The estimated coefficients for four out of the 
five complexity indices defined for each of the business lines are positive and significant. Only the 
coefficient for other financial activities is negative, but not statistically significant. The results are 
thus aligned with H3, in that the higher the difference between the business model at home and the 
business model abroad, the higher the risk.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
We have carried out two different robustness checks. The first one addresses the issue of outliers 
arising in relation to the timing of the merger processes, which could be driving the results. The 
second one addresses concerns in relation to ownership structure.    
5.1. Relevance of timing of mergers 
 
                                                 
7 The results hold if this control is removed. 
14 
 
As already mentioned, during the period under analysis a widespread consolidation process took place 
in Spain, fostered either by public authorities or pushed by the reforms affecting the banking system. 
Part of the consolidation process involved the restructuring and rationalisation of deposit-taking 
institutions. Mergers and acquisitions were also part of the process and they took place mostly among 
domestic banks  and only a very small number of large mergers were cross-border.8 As we have used 
balance sheet data, the information recorded at the time of the merger may contaminate the analysis 
of how complexity affects risk, as there may be outliers driving the results that we have obtained. 
This could happen if the merger is large enough to deeply affect the balance sheet data. To deal with 
such concerns, we present the results obtained after dropping the observations of banks whose total 
assets have grown by more than 30% between any two consecutive quarters, in line with Meslier et 
al. (2016). 
We have run tests for the same hypothesis as before. The results recorded in the first two columns of 
Table 7 and in Panel A of Tables 8 and 9 are qualitatively similar to the results presented so far. The 
only difference is that under H3 (Table 9), the coefficient for the difference between insurance 
activities at home and abroad is not statistically significant. Therefore, these results also support the 
hypothesis that a reduction in monitoring associated with increased complexity results in higher risk.  
5.2. Relevance of ownership 
The relevance that saving banks and, to a lesser degree, mutual funds, have had in Spain calls into 
question whether the results obtained in our analysis reflect the relationship between risk and 
complexity for these types of institutions. We tend to regard them as not being complex institutions 
and, consequently, the relationship between complexity and risk seems to be more difficult to 
establish. In particular, Spanish saving banks barely had any foreign subsidiaries in 2009 (around 
5.6% of the total, Berges et al., 2012). Moreover, they underwent a process of transformation, first 
                                                 
8 See Berges et al. (2012) for a description of the internationalisation process of Spanish banks and Banco de España (2017) 
for a report on the financial and banking crisis in Spain
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expanding their areas of activity both geographically and in business terms and then merging. They 
thus significantly changed their structure and increased their complexity.    
We have run the same regressions as before, but including only saving banks and mutual funds in the 
estimation. Those saving banks that chose to pursue their activities through instrumental banks are 
treated, for the sake of this analysis, as saving banks over the whole period. 
The results presented in columns (3) – (4) in Table 7 and in Panels B of Tables 8 and 9 are consistent 
with those obtained so far. The main differences stem from the lower relevance of the activity carried 
out by saving banks abroad in relation to banks, and from the countries in which they have affiliates. 
So, having excluded banks from the analysis, we have estimated a positive effect of geographic 
complexity on risk (columns (3) and (4) in Table 7; columns (2) and (4) in Panel B of Table 8).  For 
the overall sample we have found a diversification benefit from having affiliates abroad. In fact, in 
Panel B of Table 9, we find that the share of foreign activity has a statistically significant positive 
impact on risk in some cases. The high share of saving banks’ activity abroad which takes place in 
EU countries (Berges et al., 2012) may explain the different results, as it does not allow us to capture 
the diversification benefits arising from low business cycle correlation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically examine the effect on banks’ risk of geographic and business complexity, 
taking into account their interaction and their relative importance. The use of Spanish confidential 
supervisory data and more specifically, the equity instrument portfolio, enables us to investigate how 
geographic and business complexity at home and abroad affect risk. We have found that while 
business complexity results in higher risk, geographic complexity gives rise to diversification 
benefits, thus to lower risk. However, geographic complexity alone is not enough: its effects depend 
on how it interacts with business complexity. High business complexity abroad in relation to that at 
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on how it interacts with business complexity. High business complexity abroad in relation to that at 
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expanding their areas of activity both geographically and in business terms and then merging. They 
thus significantly changed their structure and increased their complexity.    
We have run the same regressions as before, but including only saving banks and mutual funds in the 
estimation. Those saving banks that chose to pursue their activities through instrumental banks are 
treated, for the sake of this analysis, as saving banks over the whole period. 
The results presented in columns (3) – (4) in Table 7 and in Panels B of Tables 8 and 9 are consistent 
with those obtained so far. The main differences stem from the lower relevance of the activity carried 
out by saving banks abroad in relation to banks, and from the countries in which they have affiliates. 
So, having excluded banks from the analysis, we have estimated a positive effect of geographic 
complexity on risk (columns (3) and (4) in Table 7; columns (2) and (4) in Panel B of Table 8).  For 
the overall sample we have found a diversification benefit from having affiliates abroad. In fact, in 
Panel B of Table 9, we find that the share of foreign activity has a statistically significant positive 
impact on risk in some cases. The high share of saving banks’ activity abroad which takes place in 
EU countries (Berges et al., 2012) may explain the different results, as it does not allow us to capture 
the diversification benefits arising from low business cycle correlation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically examine the effect on banks’ risk of geographic and business complexity, 
taking into account their interaction and their relative importance. The use of Spanish confidential 
supervisory data and more specifically, the equity instrument portfolio, enables us to investigate how 
geographic and business complexity at home and abroad affect risk. We have found that while 
business complexity results in higher risk, geographic complexity gives rise to diversification 
benefits, thus to lower risk. However, geographic complexity alone is not enough: its effects depend 
on how it interacts with business complexity. High business complexity abroad in relation to that at 
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home counterbalances the benefits of diversification. In the same vein, focusing abroad on business 
areas in which the group has no expertise at home also results in higher risk.  
We have provided evidence of the type of geographic or business diversification or consolidation that 
would increase distance-to-default and thus sustain profitability in the long run. Our analysis is 
relevant given the current concerns regarding the European banking sector’s low profitability in a low 
interest environment and how to improve it to make it sustainable. Our analysis provides support for 
the view that geographic and business complexity needs to be treated separately for regulatory 
purposes. Geographic complexity may generate diversification benefits depending on how and where 
it takes place. Higher complexity abroad or focusing abroad on business areas in which banks have 
no expertise at home may counterbalance any benefits arising from the less than perfect correlation 
of business cycles.  
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Figure 1: Number of Banks 
Figure 1 depicts the number of banks over the period 2005 - 2016 for all banks and for banks with 
affiliates (including non-financial affiliates) located outside Spain. 
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Figure 2:HHI Net Worth   
Figure 2 depicts the box plot of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) weighted by net 
worth from 2005 to 2016. Each box plot represents the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles while the circle represents the mean of the distribution. Panel A represents the 
HHI based on the distribution of affiliates among business lines (HHI_NW_Business). Panel 
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Figure 2:HHI Net Worth   
Figure 2 depicts the box plot of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) weighted by net 
worth from 2005 to 2016. Each box plot represents the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles while the circle represents the mean of the distribution. Panel A represents the 
HHI based on the distribution of affiliates among business lines (HHI_NW_Business). Panel 
B contains the HHI based on the distribution of affiliates among countries 
(HHI_NW_Country). 20 
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Figure 2:HHI Net Worth   
Figure 2 depicts the box plot of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) weighted by net 
worth from 2005 to 2016. Each box plot represents the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles while the circle represents the me n of the distribution. Panel A repr sents the
HHI based on the distribution of affiliates among business lines (HHI_NW_Business). Panel
B contains th  HHI based o  distribu ion of affiliates among countries
(HHI_NW_Country). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2132
21 
 
Figure 3: Deviation in Activity 
Figure 3 depicts the scatter plot of each bank group weight of a specific business line located in Spain versus its weight outside Spain. The red 


















































































Figure 3: Deviation in Activity 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics of banks’ characteristics and the macroeconomic factors. It 
provides information about the measurement units, mean, median, standard deviation (SD), 10th percentile 
(P10) and 90th percentile (P90).  
Panel A: Bank's characteristics 
  Units Mean  Median SD P10 P90 
z-score - 50.00 42.32 39.72 11.04 98.27 
ROA % 0.55 0.54 1.21 0.13 1.16 
ROE % 7.54 8.12 15.61 2.04 16.52 
Total assets (TA) Million € 56,607.10 9,273.68 171,396.70 778.74 95,037.08 
Loan/TA % 65.03 70.40 20.69 39.67 82.49 
NPL % 4.14 2.76 4.56 0.43 9.61 
Efficiency ratio % 56.17 54.60 14.76 38.82 73.48 
Liquid assets/TA % 1.91 1.23 2.77 0.41 3.50 
Panel B: Macroeconomic factors 
Credit-to-GDP gap % 13.45 25.95 28.80 -34.68 41.35 
GDP growth (y-o-y) % 0.86 1.20 2.84 -3.40 4.00 
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Table 2: Definition of Complexity Measures 
Panel A: Counts 
Num. Affiliates Number of affiliates. 
Num. Countries Number of countries in which a bank group has affiliates. 
Num.Business Number of business lines in which a bank group has affiliates. 













HHI_NW_NetWorth HHI based on the affiliates' structure. R corresponds to the 
maximum number of affiliates observed by a bank group in the 
database and net worth to the net worth of the affiliate j of bank i 
at time t. 
HHI_NW_Business HHI based on the business lines. R corresponds to the maximum 
number of categories and net worth to the aggregate net worth of 
affiliates of bank i in business line j at time t. 
HHI_NW_Country HHI based on the location of the affiliates at country level. R 
corresponds to the maximum number of countries observed by a 
bank group in the database and net worth to the aggregate net worth 
of affiliates of bank i located in country j at time t. 
HHI_NW_Business_Spain HHI based on the business lines located in Spain. R corresponds to 
the maximum number of categories and net worth to the aggregate 
net worth of affiliates located in Spain of bank i in business line j 
at time t. 
HHI_NW_Business_Abroad HHI based on the business lines located outside Spain. R 
corresponds to the maximum number of categories and net worth 
to the aggregate net worth of affiliates located outside Spain of 
bank i in business line j at time t. 
Panel C: Deviation in Activity 
 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵�,�,� = 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 �
��� ����� �������
�
����� ��� ����� �������





Deviation_Banking Absolute value of the difference in the weight of banking activity 
of affiliates in and out of Spain. 
Deviation_OtherFinancial Absolute value of the difference in the weight of other financial 
activity of affiliates in and out of Spain. 
Deviation_Insurance Absolute value of the difference in the weight of insurance activity 
of affiliates in and out of Spain. 
Deviation_RealEstate Absolute value of the difference in the weight of real estate activity 
of affiliates in and out of Spain. 
Deviation_NonFinancial Absolute value of the difference in the weight of non-financial 
activity of affiliates in and out of Spain. 
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Table 3: Complexity Measures Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the main descriptive statistics of the complexity measures. Complexity measures 
are grouped into three categories: i) counts (panel A); ii) HHI based on the affiliates' net worth 
(panel B); and iii) Deviation in activity (panel C). It provides information about the mean, 
median, standard deviation (SD), 10th percentile (P10) and 90th percentile (P90).  
  Mean  Median SD P10 P90 
Panel A: Counts 
Num. Affiliates 39.239 13.000 84.565 2.000 79.000 
Num. Countries 3.056 1.000 6.301 1.000 5.000 
Num. Business 3.954 4.000 1.207 2.000 5.000 
      
      
Panel B: HHI using Net Worth 
HHI_NW_NetWorth 0.332 0.286 0.271 0.010 0.719 
HHI_NW_Business 0.336 0.296 0.262 0.011 0.724 
HHI_NW_Country 0.037 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.035 
HHI_NW_Business_Spain 0.330 0.295 0.258 0.010 0.703 
HHI_NW_Business_Abroad 0.194 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.633 
      
      
Panel C: Deviation in Activity 
Deviation_Banking 0.590 0.644 0.290 0.140 0.940 
Deviation_OtherFinancial 0.464 0.389 0.377 0.011 0.990 
Deviation_Insurance 0.035 0.018 0.087 0.000 0.071 
Deviation_RealEstate 0.160 0.024 0.292 0.000 0.838 
Deviation_NonFinancial 0.186 0.039 0.297 0.000 0.758 
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Table 4: Combination of Complexity at Different Dimensions  
Table 4 reports the results of hypothesis 1. The dependent variable is the negative log of z-score 
computed over 12 quarters. Each specification contains three complexity measures: i) complexity 
measure relative to the business line; ii) complexity measure relative to the location of affiliates at 
country level; and iii) a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the previous complexity measures 
are above the median of the quarterly distribution, simultaneously, and which is the variable of 
interest. Column (1) use counts as complexity measures while column (2) use HHI based on the 
affiliates' net worth. For the complexity relative to the business line we use Num. Business and 
HHI_NW_Business measures. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Type of Complexity Measure: Counts HHI_NW 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
      
Complexity_Businesst-1 0.143*** 0.432*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
Complexity_Countryt-1 -0.026*** -1.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
D.HighComplexity_CountryBusinesst-1 0.573*** 0.402*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,428 
R-squared 0.243 0.234 
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Table 5: Relative Business Line Complexity  
Table 5 reports the results of hypothesis 2. The dependent variable is the negative log of z-score computed over 12 quarters. The variable of 
interest is the ratio between the complexity measure at business lines located in Spain and out of Spain. Columns (1) - (2) report the results using 
the simple counts to define the complexity measure while columns (3) - (4) use the HHI based on the affiliates' net worth. Additionally, we control 
in columns (2) and (4) by the complexity measure based on the location of the affiliates at country level.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Complexity Measure: Counts HHI_NW 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
          
Complexity_Business_Abroadt-1/Complexity_Business_Spaint-1 -0.000 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complexity_Countryt-1  -0.032***  -0.788*** 
  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 1428 1428 494 494 
R-squared 0.213 0.231 0.297 0.306 
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Table 6: Deviation in Business Activity 
Table 6 reports the results of hypothesis 3. The dependent variable is the negative log of z-score 
computed over 12 quarters. In each specification the variable of interest is the deviation in the size 
of the activity j inside and outside Spain. Column (1) refers to banking; column (2) to other 
financial; column (3) to insurance; column (4) to real estate; and column (5) to non-financial 
activities.  As an additional control variable we include the weight of the affiliates outside Spain 
in terms of their net worth (NW_Abroad/NW). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
            
Deviation_Bankingt-1 0.574**     
 (0.010)     
Deviation_OtherFinancialt-1  -0.063    
  (0.656)    
Deviation_Insurancet-1   0.626*   
   (0.095)   
Deviation_RealEstatet-1    0.632**  
    (0.018)  
Deviation_NonFinancialt-1     0.704*** 
     (0.006) 
NW_Abroad/NWt-1 -0.621* -0.778** -0.705** -0.566* -0.758** 
 (0.064) (0.022) (0.040) (0.093) (0.025) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 461 461 461 461 461 
R-squared 0.292 0.281 0.284 0.295 0.299 
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Table 7: Combination of Complexity at Different Dimensions (Robustness) 
Table 7 reports a variation of Table 4 with respect to the observations included in the analysis. Panel 
A excludes those mergers in which we observe an increase of more than 30% in the bank's total 
assets. Panel B excludes institutions classified as banks before the reform of the Spanish banking 
system. The dependent variable is the negative log of Z-score computed over 12 quarters. Each 
specification contains three complexity measures: i) complexity measure relative to the business 
lines; ii) complexity measure relative to the location of affiliates; and iii) a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when the previous complexity measures are above the median of the quarterly 
distribution, simultaneously. Columns (1) uses counts as complexity measures while column (3) 
uses HHI based on the affiliates' net worth. For the complexity relative to business lines we use 
Num. Business and HHI_NW_Business measures. For the complexity relative to location, we use 
the definition for country (Num. Country and HHI_NW_Country in column (1) and (2), 
respectively)).  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Excluding Mergers  Excluding Banks 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Type of Complexity Measure: Counts HHI_NW  Counts HHI_NW 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
    
Complexity_Businesst-1 0.145*** 0.495***  0.287*** 0.814*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Complexity_Countryt-1 -0.026*** -1.192***  0.112*** 4.338*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
D.HighComplexity_CountryBusinesst-1 0.580*** 0.476***  0.301** 0.399*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.015) (0.001) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1.414 1.414  1,002 1,002 
R-squared 0.243 0.237  0.394 0.365 
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Table 8: Relative Business Line Complexity (Robustness) 
Table 8 reports a variation of Table 5 with respect to the observations included in the analysis. Panel 
A excludes those mergers in which we observe an increase of more than 30% in the banking group's 
total assets. Panel B excludes, instead, institutions classified as banks before the reform of the Spanish 
banking system. The dependent variable is the negative log of z-score computed over 12 quarters. The 
variable of interest is the ratio between complexity measure based on the business lines located in 
Spain and out of Spain. Additionally, we control by the complexity measure based on the location of 
the affiliates. Columns (1) – (2) use the complexity measure based on counts while columns (3) – (4) 
the measures based on the HHI of the affiliates’ net worth.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Excluding Mergers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Complexity Measure: Counts HHI_NW 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
          
Complexity_Bus_Abroadt-1/Complexity_Bus_Spaint-1 0.000 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 -0.001 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complexity_Countryt-1  -0.032***  -0.790*** 
  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes 
Observations 1414 1414 488 488 
R-squared 0.212 0.230 0.298 0.306 
Panel B. Excluding Banks 
Type of Complexity Measure: Counts HHI_NW 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
      
Complexity_Bus_Abroadt-1/Complexity_Bus_Spaint-1 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complexity_Countryt-1  0.089**  2.030** 
  (0.037)  (0.024) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1002 1002 332 332 
R-squared 0.377 0.382 0.514 0.519 
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Table 9: Deviation in Business Activity (Robustness) 
Table 9 reports a variation of Table 6 with respect to the observations included in the analysis. 
Panel A excludes those mergers in which we observe an increase of more than 30% in the banking 
group's total assets. Panel B excludes, instead, institutions classified as banks before the reform 
of the Spanish banking system. The dependent variable is the negative log of Z-score computed 
over 12 quarters. In each specification the variable of interest is the deviation in the size of activity 
j inside and outside Spain. Column (1) refers to banking; column (2) to other financial; column 
(3) to insurance; column (4) to real estate; and column (5) to non-financial activities.  As an 
additional control variable we include the weight of the affiliates outside Spain in terms of their 
net worth. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Excluding Mergers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: -ln(z-score) 
            
Deviation_Bankingt-1 0.568**     
 (0.013)     
Deviation_OtherFinancialt-1 -0.062    
  (0.661)    
Deviation_Insurancet-1   0.577   
   (0.138)   
Deviation_RealEstatet-1    0.630**  
    (0.019)  
Deviation_NonFinancialt-1     0.709*** 
     (0.006) 
NW_Abroad/NWt-1 -0.624* -0.780** -0.718** -0.564* -0.761** 
 (0.065) (0.023) (0.038) (0.098) (0.026) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 455 455 455 455 455 
R-squared 0.294 0.283 0.285 0.296 0.301 
Panel B: Excluding Banks 
Deviation_Bankingt-1 0.808***     
 (0.000)     
Deviation_OtherFinancialt-1  -0.174    
  (0.287)    
Deviation_Insurancet-1   0.732**   
   (0.029)   
Deviation_RealEstatet-1    0.509**  
    (0.032)  
Deviation_NonFinancialt-1     0.500** 
     (0.026) 
NW_Abroad/NWt-1 3.125*** 1.552 1.673 2.300* 1.535 
 (0.007) (0.375) (0.316) (0.091) (0.363) 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 299 299 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.513 0.500 0.502 0.507 0.508 
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